Partisan politics and job allocation
published: Sunday | February 8, 2004
The following is an edited document prepared by the People's National Party Policy Commission on November 10, 2003 in the aftermath of the Temple Hall murders. The document was presented at a joint Executive/Parliamentary Group meeting of the Party on January 13, 2004 and adopted. The document is an attempt by the Party to confront the need for transformational change in Jamaica's political culture.
THE MURDERS at Temple Hall constitute a dramatic reminder that partisan distribution of work and other 'scarce benefits' continues to lie at the core of political violence and the old tribal political order in Jamaica. The October 2002 manifesto of the People's National Party (PNP) recommits the Party "to be the architects of a new kind of governance that challenges the old order" [Manifesto of the PNP Advancing the Quality Society, p. 59]. Hence partisan political distribution of work contradicts the Manifesto commitment. It also reinforces 'the old order', subverts the Party leader's call for national unity and contributes to the alienation of an increasing proportion of the electorate from both the PNP and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).
If it is to be credible, the PNP needs to turn its back once and for all, in deeds and not just words, on this manifestation of tribalism and work to convince the JLP to do likewise. Moreover, failure to confront this issue as a matter of the greatest urgency shall subvert the party effort to transform and to rebuild itself. Instead, it will only serve to further deepen political divisiveness at the very moment when the challenges and opportunities of globalisation compel Jamaicans to unite.
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
The underlying causes and consequences of partisan political determination of work distribution and other public goods have been repeatedly analysed. Here is a sample:
The fight for scarce benefits and political spoils has contributed to a polarised society in which we operate as hostile tribes which seem to be perpetually at war rather than working together to realize a common goal P.J. Patterson, Promoting Better Values and Attitudes, 1994, p. 4.
If the purpose of politics is the distribution of favours one had better make sure that there are enough favours to go around or those who are not favoured will rise up in due course and smite those who are Michael Manley, The Politics of Change, 1974, p. 74.
Clientelism in the Jamaican context, constrains genuine democratic forms associated with parliamentary democracy, promotes personalised authority and therefore weak, non-autonomous and partially bureaucratised institutions , encourages low levels of accountability in political life and high concentrations of personal power, retards the development of a civic sense of a national interest independent of party political interests, discourages independent individual and group participation in public life... It represents a species of authoritarian democracy the democratic content of which is anchored on the ballot box and competitive elections Carl Stone, Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica, 1980, p. 109.
The allocation of scarce state resources by the political party in office and the award of public contracts on the basis of partisan favouritism have served to create violent divisions between political beneficiaries and the supporters of opposing parties - National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997, p. 58.
Among the factors giving rise to crime and violence are political tribalism that leads people to be overly dependent on their elected officials and to make such support contingent on public largess [and] the emergence of leadership in some communities that has its roots in political tribalism and the drug culture; and, which effectively undermines the traditional leadership to be found in community institutions National Committee on Crime and Violence, 2002.
Jamaica cannot afford another political war. Irregardless of which party wins that war, Jamaica will be the loser Edward Seaga, Address to the National Conference of the JLP, Nov 18, 2001 p.18.
It is clear that the partisan distribution of work contributes to crime and violence and the weakening of democratic governance. So why does it continue?
We need recall only two of the most recent recommendations from national bodies, which include representatives of the PNP.
It is a fact that informal/non- traditional community leaders figure in the contractual and distributive aspects of political work. Politicians, as part of an overall code of conduct, must be required to desist from these practices and instead to seek the assistance of the properly constituted national and community organ(s) in channelling work and benefits to constituents - National Committee on Crime and Violence [PNP representatives K.D. Knight; subsequently Peter Phillips], 2002, p. 12
The Committee having reviewed the objectives and structure of the SESP (Social and Economic Support Programme) recommends that the programme be abolished. Programmes of the SESP can be adequately achieved through the various Ministries and Agencies of Government, without direct involvement of the Member of Parliament National Committee on Political Tribalism [PNP representatives Maxine Henry-Wilson, Danny Roberts, 1997, p. 60. Some recommendations of the various task forces have been implemented by successive governments, for example:
The establishment of the Office of the Contractor-General.
The establishment of the National Contracts Commission.
These and other measures, however, have been relatively ineffective.
The main reason for this failure is clear: despite all the words against tribalism, critical sections of party leaderships and followerships have hitherto been convinced that, from a party electoral point of view, the benefits from tribalism, in terms of votes, outweigh other costs to the party and to national development.
The deepening of globalisation, the heightening of the national crisis and the declining voter support for tribal politics requires this conclusion to be re-examined and the cost-benefit calculation to be urgently revised. In this regard, it is clear that the electoral benefit from this activity is one of diminishing returns.
TRIBALISTS
Legitimate largesse available to any party and to the Jamaican state has significantly declined. As a consequence, discontent and pressure on the party grows among those who do party work only in return for 'what yu can do for me'. In this situation, this hard core invariably shrinks at the very same time as its ability to deliver the vote of even party supporters (much less the mass of 'uncommitted' who are seriously alienated by a range of factors including the behaviour of the very tribalists seeking their support) declines.
Clearly therefore, the electoral benefit of partisan allocation of scarce benefits is declining even as the costs to the party and to the nation are increasing. Partisan electoral self-interest which hitherto would have argued for tribalism now demands demise. To this extent, the party's and the national interest coincide.
STRATEGIC ISSUES
The fundamental strategic issues are these:
Firstly, there is a deepening disconnection between the values, norms and behaviour of a 30 per cent minority of the Jamaican electorate who promote the claims of party support over the rights of Jamaican citizenship and an increasing majority who take a diametrically opposed view.
Secondly, the party leaderships nevertheless depend to a significant extent on this minority for electoral purposes, even as this force is able to deliver only diminishing electoral returns. Unavoidably, the electoral effectiveness of this core is declining as the distance widens between its tribal culture and the main body of all the social classes and sectors.
The PNP now faces a choice: (1) either to be proactive, to take the moral high ground (increasingly coinciding with enlightened self-interest) and prioritise the break with tribalism in renewed exploration of a political partnership with the JLP; or, (2) to continue on the current path, and later, from a weakened position, be reactive, compelled by the circumstances of deepening crisis to seek an accommodation with the JLP in making the break with tribalism.
TEMPLE HALL
Following the political murders over job distribution in Temple Hall, the agreements arrived at between the PNP, JLP, civil society and the contractors appear, in practice, to be breaking with the tribal-partisan distribution of work. It provided the elements, talked about in countless reports, of a new approach which, with modifications to suit local circumstances, need to be developed in an appropriate Memorandum of Understanding and urgently applied elsewhere.
In all areas where publicly funded, job-creating projects are due to begin, broad-based community meetings of the citizens must be convened by some respected authority either the project holders themselves or the PMI. To such meetings would be invited the contractor, the political directorate in the area MP, Councillor, caretakers leading party activists, community organisation leaders and the citizenry in general.
Such a meeting would discuss and agree on:
The right of the contractor to hire and fire based on the skill, expertise and performance of the applicant/employee and, in the case of unskilled manual labour, taking into account need and geographical spread. This would eliminate the role of any partisan liaison officer, area leader or don.
The contents of the application form which a job-applicant would be required to complete;
The locations where job-applicants would be required to attend and the resource persons who would oversee the on-site completion of application forms.
In this approach the role of the party and party supporter/leaders on the ground would no longer be to oversee a tribal division of jobs ( on whatever arithmetic formula) but instead to prepare/ motivate/ facilitate supporters in making application for the available jobs. Their employment prospects would be no greater nor less than that of any other citizen.
For this approach to work and for the resistance of tribalist forces to be overcome, the following is indispensable:
Active support of the top leadership of both parties;
Active support from a majority of the political directorate on the ground in the area concerned;
Active support from the media and from civil society in the area and nationally;
Protection of the process from violent disruption from tribalists by the military and the police;
In the medium term, a regulatory regime governing Jamaican political parties, inclusive of requirements relating to upholding the rights of the Jamaican people, transparency, together with entitlements to public funding etc.
The redefinition, in practice as well as in formal terms, of the role and responsibility of councillors and MPs away from that of godfather/provider to that of interest-articulator/advocate (e.g. Ronald Thwaites Kingston Harbour fishermen; Pearnel Charles Kraal community).
The redefinition of the role of the party activist on the ground to complement electoral tasks with the responsibilities of becoming, in effect, a party community worker.
We should await neither more political murders nor further electoral decline to advance the break with tribalism immediately.
