There are two schools of thought on how to cut Jamaica's world-leading homicide rate. The social-rehabilitation-first paradigm says that until you address the underlying causes of crime - poverty, inequality, undereducation, broken families, gangs, drugs, political tribalism, etc - all efforts to stem the slaughter will be in vain.

'Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' proponents agree that only economic growth and social justice can produce a truly peaceful society in the long term. But they argue that properly equipped and intelligent policing, backed by tougher laws and a resolve to put criminals behind bars, can significantly reduce the murder count. And lower crime levels will help generate the increased business investment necessary to create prosperity and equality.

A 2007 article entitled 'The Unsung Story of Sáo Paulo's Murder Rate Drop' (http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html) pretty much settles the argument.

"Murders dropped by half in Sáo Paulo since the year 2000. The singular fall of the violent crime in that city proves a disconnect between murder rates and wider socio-economic forces", the writers say. Ted Goertzel is professor of sociology at Rutgers University, United States, and Tulio Kahn is a sociologist in Sáo Paulo, Brazil.

In 2000, Jamaica and Sáo Paulo had similar murder rates of about 35 per 100,000. Since then, ours has increased by 73 per cent and theirs has fallen by 68 per cent to 59.2 and 11.6 per 100,000, respectively. If we had the same homicide rate as Sáo Paulo in 2007, only 306 Jamaicans would have been murdered last year instead of 1,574, meaning 1,268 more Jamaicans would be alive today. Such numbers should make even politicians pay attention.

What did they do that we didn't? "The homicide decline in the state of Sáo Paulo in the first decade of this century is similar to the decline in New York City in the 1990s. In both cases, the police adopted more effective methods. In Sáo Paulo, the state police forces gave new priority to gathering accurate and timely empirical data and using it to plan and evaluate programmes.

"An intergovernmental communications network was established to link the military and civil police. Crimes were entered into a geographic information system, and saturation units were sent to areas controlled by drug traffickers. A data base was established with photographs of over 300,000 criminals. Telephone switchboards were set up to receive citizen complaints of incidents, and a website was opened to take reports of thefts of vehicles, documents and cellular telephones.

"Community policing stations were opened, and a homicide combat unit was organised with an emphasis on solving difficult cases. A specialised unit was organised to provide supportive assistance to women who were victims of sexual crimes. Sophisticated computer software linked information from police reports with bank records, telephone records and probable areas of residence. And the police began more aggressive efforts to remove illegal firearms from the streets.

imprisonment increase

"As a consequence of these efforts, the number of imprisonments in the state of Sáo Paulo increased from 18,602 in the first quarter of 1996 to 30,831 in the first quarter of 2001, after which it settled back to approximately 23,000 a month. This increase in the number of convicts sent to prison each quarter of the year led to a steady increase in the state's prison population. The turning point in the state's criminal homicide rate came at the peak of this increase in imprisonments.

"Gun control was another important factor in the crime drop. In October 2003, the Brazilian federal government enacted a new set of laws to limit the importation of firearms, make it illegal to own unregistered guns or to carry guns on the street, and increase the penalties for violation of gun- control laws.

"Passing legislation is not enough; the legislation must be vigorously enforced by the state police forces. In Sáo Paulo, confiscations of firearms by the police rose from 6,539 in the first quarter of 1996 to 11,670 in the second quarter of 1999. This peak coincides with the beginning of the great Sáo Paulo homicide drop."

The authors empirically dismiss the 'nothing will work if we don't fix everything first' argument.

"Before the recent homicide drop, Brazil's high homicide rates were frequently attributed to high levels of poverty and inequality. In a recent book, historian Luis Mir insisted that Brazil was in a state of civil war and characterised Sáo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro as metropolises of death.

Mir insisted that "nothing can be done about the problem until the majority and the minority sit down and discuss the slices of the pie" that each social class receives (Geracao Online, 2004). His book was published three years after the homicide rates in Sáo Paulo had begun their sharp decline, yet no such radical reslicing of the socio-economic pie had taken place.

predicting crime rate

The same thing happened to leading American criminologists James Q. Wilson and John DiIulio who published works in the early 1990s predicting massive increases in crime rates after the rates had already begun their precipitous decline.

These analysts erred by attributing cyclical peaks in crime waves to persistent social and economic problems, underestimating the extent to which violent crime has its own dynamics and can be treated as a separate problem. When crime waves get out of hand the public demands action, political leaders allocate more resources, and the criminal justice system does its best to respond.

In both Brazil and the United States, police authorities took effective action to reduce violent crime without waiting for underlying social problems to be resolved. This was also true in Colombia where homicide declined 15 per cent in the three years from 2003 to 2006.

By contrast, homicide rates in Venezuela have increased 67 per cent since 1999, despite a booming economy and a populist government that claims to be redistributing wealth to the poor.

The great Sáo Paulo homicide drop shows that effective measures can be taken to reduce lethal crime without waiting to solve underlying socio-economic problems.

Prime Minister Golding's recent crime proposals -such as mandatory sentencing for gun crimes, tougher bail conditions, DNA recording of criminal suspects, and live video-witness testimony - are steps in the right direction. But these need to be part of a well- thought-out, coordinated, over arching plan. The tried and tested Sáo Paulo model is an obvious template for Jamaica.

Why reinvent the wheel? Send our security experts to study Sáo Paulo's crime fighting set-up thoroughly. Bring an architect of 'the great Sáo Paulo homicide drop' here to examine our present situation. Then design a similar programme adapted to our own circumstances. It shouldn't be tough to get United States, United Kingdon and Europena Union aid to implement a proven strategy that has worked so well elsewhere.

Sáo Paulo's criminal dynamics probably have a lot in common with ours. While richer than Jamaica, Brazil's much higher Gini coefficient (56.7 to 45.5) suggests that its wealth is far more un- equally distributed. And its favela (shanty towns) are by all reports every bit as violent and poverty stricken as our innercity ghettos. As for corrupt and brutal security forces, it is unlikely our Jamaican police are worse than their Brazilian counterparts, who are infamous for their death squads.

Policemen detain two suspects during an anti-drug raid in a Brazilian slum on April 28.- AP

Yet, while Sáo Paulo gangs seem just as ruthless and vicious as those in Jamaica, they likely have no connections to dominant political parties. That, alas, might make all the difference. Without a common political will to implement them, all the proven crime-fighting solutions in the world mean nothing. Until we get two party heads willing to put country before power, this island will continue to swim in blood. Please send feedback to changkob@hotmail.com or columns@gleanerjm.com