Edward SeagaThe long-anticipated General Election 2007 was held on September 3. At the time of writing the final counting of ballots was proceeding and seats were being added to one party and deducted from the other.
On election night the preliminary count showed JLP 31, PNP 29, a most uncomfortable margin of two seats for the JLP. With one member of the majority party to be selected as the Speaker, the floor of the House of Representatives would have a razor-thin margin of one vote. A party would have the greatest difficulty in functioning with such a tiny margin. In many cases, the Speaker would have to be called to use his/her casting vote. The Prime Minister and his ministers would find it very difficult to travel while the House was in session.
safer from nightmare
It now appears that the new JLP government is safer from that nightmare since two additional seats have been declared for the party, bringing the total count to 33.
However, a nagging question of the disqualification of some winning candidates whom the court may declare to be nominated unconstitutionally according to Section 40 (2) (a) of the Constitution, still remains to be dealt with, and this could again change the seat count. These cases should be given the earliest dates for hearing by the court so as to remove all doubt of the final position.
From the strength anddominance of the JLP campaign directed by JLP leader Bruce Golding, many people expected a greater JLP victory. Golding's campaign ranks with my 1980 JLP and Michael Manley's 1972 PNP campaigns as the best organised and most spectacular in electoral history.
stronger showing
In every area the Golding campaign had a stronger showing compared to the PNP effort in advertising, campaigning as a team, manifesto, political debates and financing. This is not to say that Portia Simpson Miller's campaign was ineffective. The strength of her personal popularity gave her strong electoral support but it was not enough. She was almost alone.
Bruce Golding is to be congratulated on an excellent campaign and well earned victory. It has brought back hope to that considerable number of JLP supporters who had been longing for a victory.
Bruce, however, must be asking himself what else could he have done to earn the bigger victory he was expecting. While improvements were possible, the substantive answer is that there are many more supporters of the PNP in Jamaica than the JLP. This is why the JLP since 1949 has won elections on tiny margins of votes, except for 1980 when the margin of votes for the JLP was one of the largest ever. The PNP on the other hand, almost always secures comfortable margins. The figures below show the difference in voting strength.
Jamaica General Elections
Election years and winning % margins in election won by the JLP Election years and winning % margins in election won by the PNP
Year JLP PNP Percent Point Difference Year JLP PNP Percent Point Difference
1944 41.4% 23.5% 17.9% 1955 39.0% 50.4% 11.4%
1949 42.7% 43.5% -0.8% 1959 44.3% 54.8% 10.5%
1962 50.0% 48.6% 1.4% 1972 43.4% 56.4% 13.0%
1967 50.7% 49.1% 1.6% 1976 43.2% 56.8% 13.6%
1980 58.9% 41.1% 17.8% 1989 43.3% 56.6% 13.3%
2007 50.2% 49.8% 0.4% 1993 37.5% 60.4% 22.9%
1997 38.9% 56.2% 17.3%
2002 47.5% 52.0% 4.5%
the many independent candidates not included.]
The figures demonstrate very narrow margins of victory for the JLP in all elections won by the JLP: 1949, 1962, 1967, and 2007 except in 1980. (In fact in
1949 the PNP lost the electio polling slightly more votes than the JLP).
In effect, this means that the JLP repeatedly has a far greater struggle than the PNP to secure an election victory. In this context the modest margin of the 2007 election must be seen as a significant JLP victory.
The question that arises is what is the reason for this phenomenon? Simply put, it is a manifestation of the political stratification of class support. Both the JLP and PNP have substantial grass roots support. The middle class is split with the upper middle class generally supporting the JLP and lower middle class mostly the PNP. The class preferences of the upper class, generally JLP, is too marginal to be meaningfully effective.
The dynamics of the class preference is based on a more rapid growth of the lower middle class than the upper middle class. The education system is producing substantial numbers of graduates annually from the reportedly 15,000 young people who are enrolled in tertiary training institutions: universities, colleges, teachers and nurses training institutions, and so on. The graduates of these institutions move up the social ladder to the lower middle class from which some eventually become members of the upper middle strata.
This upward class mobility is a dominant dynamic which can be expected to produce annually many more persons likely to support the PNP than JLP through their acquired political class preferences.
The JLP has much work to do in breaking into this growing lower middle class area if it is to strengthen its hard won victory for the future.
Ironically, it is this same class bias that has reduced the political strength of Portia Simpson Miller whose party was in the lead until the last phase of the campaign. Her weak performance in the debate and confused decisions on the election date and state of emergency persuaded many undecided electors and others that she was not in control. These decisive votes supplemented the strong class bias of middle class PNP supporters who felt that her image was inconsistent with profiles of past PNP leaders, meaning her social background was deficient. Yet, it is that social background from which Portia drew considerable support which prevented the PNP from slipping further in the electoral result. The PNP, therefore, has a defining decision to make: whether to follow Portia deeper into reinforcing the grass roots strength of the PNP, or to strategically move back to the growing middle class.
Politics in Jamaica is more deeply rooted in the class structure than most people recognise, or many understand, or some wish to admit. It is as much a determining factor as is the political strength of good management and the other readily recognised voting considerations.
Hence, the work to be done by both parties to secure greater strength is not only in strengthening their political organisations, but deeper assessment of their class involvement.
Edward Seaga is a former Prime Minister. He is now a Distinguished Fellow at the UWI. E-mail: odf@uwimona.edu.jm
