Rev. Clinton Chisolm, ContributorThere has been much muddled thinking from Christians and non-Christians alike concerning the issue of the presence of evil vis-a-vis an all-powerful and all-loving God.
As we reflect, we need to realise that there is a distinction between natural evil (suffering, natural disasters, etc.) and moral evil (indictable action/inaction of sentient beings and their consequences). It is critical that we bear in mind as well that evil is real but it is not a being, thing, substance or entity and thus it cannot be created.
Additionally, according to the Judaeo-Christian scriptures (Genesis 1 and 2), neither the sentient angelic being popularly called Satan or the devil nor the original sentient pair of humans (Adam and Eve), were 'created evil'. Moral evil can be described as a deviation from a norm of goodness occasioned by the exercise of free will.
But what really is the problem at hand? Atheistic philosopher J.L. Mackie explains, "God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time, all three are essential parts of most theological positions; the theologian, it seems at once, must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three." (The Philosophy of Religion, Basil Mitchell (ed.), 1971, p. 92-93.)
Those who argue that the presence of evil is a serious problem for those who believe in an all-loving, all-knowing and all-powerful God, often do not realise that there is no necessary or explicit contradiction involved in believing in such a God in a world with evil.
Even Mackie, in a later work, admitted this but he went on to raise an implicit contradiction which requires a response.
He says, "It is true that there is no explicit contradiction between the statements that there is an omnipotent and wholly good god and that there is evil. But if we add the at least initially plausible premise that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do, then we do have a contradiction. A wholly good omnipotent being would eliminate evil completely; if there really are evils, then there cannot be any such being." (See his deceptively titled work The Miracle of Theism, 1982, p.150, emphasis added.)
Let's be clear on what Mackie is attempting here. To establish a contradiction he adds two ideas or premises 1. a wholly good being eliminates evil as far as he can and 2. there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do.
Mackie can succeed in his attempt only if these two premises are true and essential to Christian theism or just true, basically. Unfortunately, neither of Mackie's two ideas succeeds.
Christian philosopher Ronald Nash, draws on the work of another celebrated Christian philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, as he shows the weaknesses of Mackie's two added premises. I would highly recommend Nash's book (indeed any book by him), Faith and Reason, 1988, for all tough-minded Christians. Planting's work, also recommended, is God, Freedom and Evil, 1974.
What Nash urges (pp.183-186) is the thought that it is not true that an omnipotent being can do anything, bar nothing. Things which are logically impossible, like squaring a circle, cannot be done by God because they are really false tasks and in addition, according to Hebrews 6.13, 18, God can neither lie nor swear by a being greater than Himself. So Mackie's second premise fails.
The other premise fails too because God could allow certain evils to exist because getting rid of them would result in the existence of greater evils or the loss of greater goods or because God has some other purpose that could be fulfilled through the evil or because God has appointed a future time to eliminate evil.
Raising reasons why God would not eliminate all evil involves what is called a theodicy (showing that God is justified in permitting evil) and a defence (offering logically possible reasons why God permits evil). Both seek to answer the critic's query, 'why would and how could God permit evil?'.
Alvin Plantinga is known for his free will defence and we quote him fairly fully. He says, "Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good." (God, Freedom and Evil, p.30.)
There is more to be explored concerning the natural law theodicy (evil permitted based on the cause and effect, lawlike nature of the cosmos) and the soul-making theodicy (genuine character can only be built in a world with evil) and interested readers should consult Nash, but we make the point from what has been said that there is nothing illogical about a belief in God despite the presence of evil in the world.
